

VZCZCXRO6672
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0486/01 1661455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151455Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2080
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000486

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2012

TAGS: [PREL](#) [IS](#) [IR](#)

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL STALEMATE ON IRANIAN STATEMENTS
THREATENING ISRAEL

REF: A. HEFFERN-PHEE E-MAIL JUNE 11

[1](#)B. WAYMAN-PHEE E-MAIL JUNE 12

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Ambassador Alejandro Wolff for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary and Action Request: Efforts to obtain a Security Council press statement condemning Iranian President Ahmadinejad's June 3 remarks threatening Israel's existence have foundered over Indonesian opposition, first announced to the Council on June 8. In a second Council discussions of the issue June 11, Qatar and China supported the Indonesian position. Indonesian DPR Hassan Kleib has advised USUN privately that he is under direct instructions from President Yudhoyono and the Foreign Minister not/not to support a press statement due to domestic Parliamentary opposition to Indonesia's support for the most recent Iran sanctions resolution (UNSCR 1747). USUN seeks guidance on Council condemnation of Ahmadinejad's remarks. End Summary and Action Request.

[1](#)2. (C) Following Ahmadinejad's remarks threatening Israel's existence which he made on the anniversary of Khomeini's death June 3, USUN worked with the Secretariat to arrange for UN Secretary-General Ban to issue a critical statement, which he

SIPDIS

did on June 7. USUN also worked with the French and Belgian delegations to prepare a Security Council press statement condemning the remarks, which the French introduced during Council consultations on June 8. During that meeting, Indonesian DPR Kleib said Indonesia could not support the press statement because in the past the Council had failed to respond to inflammatory statements made by Israeli officials and objectionable Israeli practices.

[1](#)3. (C) The Belgians, who are serving as the monthly Council president, revised the press statement and raised the subject again in Council consultations June 11. DPR Kleib said that while Indonesia did not support Ahmadinejad's remarks, neither did Indonesia consider the statements, which he described as "mere rhetoric," truly threatening to peace and security. The issue for Indonesia, however, is not one of language, but of what Kleib called Council "selectivity" in treating issues in the Middle East. The representatives from Qatar and China associated themselves with Kleib's remarks, emphasizing their agreement with the accusation of Council "selectivity" on Middle Eastern issues. Ambassador Khalilzad and all European representatives said the Council must respond to Ahmadinejad's remarks, which are offensive and inconsistent with the obligations of a UN member state. With the Council deadlocked (press statements require consensus), the Belgian PR closed the meeting by deferring Council discussion on the subject.

[1](#)4. (C) USUN subsequently prepared a third revision for Kleib, who shared it with his Foreign Minister. Kleib then

reported to Amb Khalilzad that Indonesia remained unable to support any press statement due to intense Parliamentary pressure on the President for his support for the most recent Iran sanctions resolution, UNSCR 1747. (This explanation was also shared by Indonesian officials with Embassy Jakarta and by the Indonesian Ambassador to Washington with EAP, ref e-mails.) In another conversation June 14 with USUN, Kleib shared his view that he saw no prospect of Indonesia agreeing to the press statement. He reported that Parliamentary critics of Indonesia's vote on UNSCR 1747 are seeking an explanation of the Indonesian President's phone conversation with POTUS prior to that vote, suggesting he buckled to U.S. demands. Thus, he reasoned, additional USG pressure on the press statement would not be successful.

15. (C) USUN has remained in close contact with the Israeli delegation throughout this process. Israeli PR Dan Gillerman confirmed to Amb Khalilzad June 14 that Israel would like to see additional efforts to secure adoption of the press statement. If unanimity cannot be reached due to Indonesian opposition, Israel would like to see the Council adopt a resolution condemning Ahmadinejad's remarks. Amb Gillerman said his delegation believes the Council must respond to such rhetoric and is prepared to live with a split vote.

16. (C) Comment: As DPR Kleib is acting on instructions from his President, it appears the only way to secure a shift in the Indonesian position is for senior USG officials to intervene with Jakarta at the highest levels. If such an effort is unsuccessful, USUN can prepare a draft resolution (no other delegation is likely to take this on). USUN believes it can secure adoption of a resolution with work in NY and in capitals. However, it is likely that such a resolution could receive between four and six abstentions (Indonesia, Qatar, China, South Africa, Panama and Congo), sending a mixed signal to Iran and others about the Council's

USUN NEW Y 00000486 002 OF 002

rejection of Ahmadinejad's statement. It is also possible that Indonesia and Qatar could vote against a resolution. Delegations voting against or abstaining will deliver an explanation of vote regretting Ahmadinejad's remarks but arguing that the Council is not evenhanded in its treatment of Middle Eastern issues. The "selectivity" allegation is likely to appear more potent when juxtaposed against the current crisis in Gaza. This "selectivity" argument may also be aggravated by U.S. sponsorship of a resolution. The French, who agreed to put forward the press statement to avoid complicating the matter by introducing the dynamic of U.S.-Iran tensions, have informed USUN they will not sponsor a resolution and they will not engage in diplomatic efforts to secure support for a resolution. The British have also informed USUN they will not sponsor a resolution, citing their own tensions with Iran and their judgment that such a resolution will further complicate the anticipated negotiations on another Iran nuclear sanctions resolution. A final pretext that could be put forward by other delegations is process; some delegations may argue that given the failure to reach unanimity it is inappropriate to force Council action via a resolution. End Comment.
WOLFF